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The Protection of Innocence Under 
Section 7 of the Charter 
Kent Roach* 
Unlike debates about the proper reach of section 7 of the Charter with 
respect to health care or welfare rights, the idea that principles of 
fundamental justice would be offended by the imprisonment of the 
innocent is utterly uncontroversial. Indeed, as early as Reference re 
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2),1 Lamer J. stated that “[i]t 
has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the 
innocent not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as an 
essential element of a system for the administration of justice which is 
founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person and 
on the rule of law”.2 The anxiety about the appropriate role of the 
judiciary that has caused the Court to pull back when giving content to 
the principles of fundamental justice even in other areas of criminal 
justice such as the imposition of fault3 or harm4 standards do not seem to 
apply to the judicial duty to protect the innocent. If any subject is within 
the inherent domain of the judiciary, it is the protection of the innocent 
from punishment.  
The principle that the innocent not be punished is as compelling as 
it is uncontroversial. In United States of America v. Burns,5 the Court 
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1 [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 69. 
2 Id., at para. 67. The Court has repeatedly relied on this principle in subsequent cases. 
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 
62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; R. v. Leipert, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 24; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 668. 
3 R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
4 R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571. 
5 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
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not only took notice of the tragic reality of wrongful convictions, but 
changed its interpretation of section 7 of the Charter in recognition of 
the risk that they may occur in the future.  
Although the principle that the innocent not be punished is a 
bedrock principle of fundamental justice, it is not self-executing or easy 
to administer. There is a danger that the principle will be used in an ad 
hoc manner and as a rhetorical flourish. Properly understood, however, 
the principle that the innocent not be punished can be one of the 
unifying principles of section 7 as it relates to the administration of 
justice.6 The principle that the innocent should not be punished reflects 
our basic expectation that the justice system be just. It stands for an 
abiding commitment that our justice system will take all reasonable 
precautions to prevent and remedy miscarriages of justice. 
The principle that the innocent not be convicted operates at two 
levels: one in relation to an individual case in which there is reason to 
think that a person may have suffered a miscarriage of justice7 and 
second in relation to systemic measures that can be taken across cases to 
minimize the risk of miscarriages of justice and especially wrongful 
convictions8 in future cases. Both aspects of the principle must be 
respected because while it is important to minimize the risks of 
wrongful convictions at a systemic level, systemic reforms will not be 
full-proof. With respect to individual cases, the Court should be guided 
by the principle that guilt should be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt and it should be reluctant to balance a reasonable possibility or a 
reasonable doubt about innocence against social interests. At the same 
time, the idea of balancing competing interests, or its more disciplined 
cousin of allowing proportionate restrictions on rights, is perhaps 
                                                                                                            
6 In this paper, I focus on the criminal trial process, but the concept of miscarriages of 
justice can apply to other areas such as long term detention under immigration law where people 
are deprived of life, liberty and security of the person without “sufficient safeguards for the 
determination of whether the criteria for detention accurately apply to that person”. Kent Roach & 
Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terrorism” (2005) 109 Penn. State L. 
Rev. 967, at 1037.  
7 A miscarriage of justice is a broader concept than the wrongful conviction of a person 
who is “actually innocent”. It would include the conviction of a person in the face of a reasonable 
doubt or a reasonable possibility of innocence, as well as denying a person a fair trial.  
8 A wrongful conviction is a sub-category of the broader concept of a miscarriage of 
justice and refers to the conviction of those who are actually innocent. Courts do not usually 
recognize the concept of innocence as part of the regular trial process, but they have taken notice of 
the conviction of the innocence and have recognized the concept of innocence in the process of re-
opening convictions. See Reference re Milgaard, [1992] S.C.J. No. 35, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866. 
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unavoidable when discussing systemic measures to minimize the risk of 
wrongful convictions in future cases. The latter conclusion may strike 
many concerned about wrongful convictions as problematic and even 
morally suspect. Nevertheless, I will suggest in the first part of this 
paper that it is supported by the writings of two of the 20th century’s 
leading theorists of law and rights: Lon Fuller9 and Ronald Dworkin.10 
Moreover, I will suggest that a more forthright recognition of the 
competing interests at stake and application of principles of 
proportionality when crafting systemic measures may produce more, not 
less, protections against the risk of wrongful convictions.  
The analytical distinction between the need under section 7 to 
respond to the risk of wrongful convictions in future cases and the need 
to respond to the possibility of a miscarriage of justice in an individual 
case will be used throughout this paper. I will explore the implications 
of the dual aspects of preventing miscarriages of justice by examining 
the Court’s decision in United States of America v. Burns.11 In that case, 
the Court was concerned not so much with the risk of a wrongful 
conviction or a miscarriage of justice in the individual case before it, but 
rather with the systemic risk of a wrongful conviction in future cases 
should fugitives be extradited without assurances that the death penalty 
would not be applied. Burns is revealing because it engaged in a form of 
proportionality analysis that the Court failed to perform a decade earlier 
in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)12 when it ruled that a fugitive 
could be extradited to face the death penalty. The proportionality 
analysis in Burns reached the conclusion that the state’s legitimate 
interest in extradition could be satisfied in a less rights invasive manner 
by obtaining assurances that the death penalty not be applied. The use of 
proportionality analysis in Burns supports the idea that systemic reforms 
designed to minimize the risks of wrongful convictions will require 
some form of interest balancing. Moreover, it suggests that a disciplined 
proportionality analysis will often produce more, not less, protections 
for the accused. 
The Court’s section 7 jurisprudence on disclosure will next be 
examined in light of the dual aspects of protecting innocence discussed 
                                                                                                            
9 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at 
179-80. 
10 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), c. 3. 
11 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
12 [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. 
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above. The Court’s decision in R. v. Stinchcombe13 required full 
disclosure to the accused of all relevant and non-privileged information 
in the Crown’s possession in no small part to respond to the risk, 
identified by the Marshall Commission,14 that lack of full disclosure 
could contribute to wrongful convictions in future cases. The Court 
boldly created a broad right to disclosure in all cases in part because of 
its concern about Parliament’s inertia in responding to the Marshall 
Commission’s recommendations that disclosure requirements be 
included in the Criminal Code. At the same time, however, the Court 
engaged in a balancing of interests and concluded that a right to 
disclosure would not only make the trial process fairer, but more 
efficient. I will also examine the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence 
enforcing Stinchcombe and suggest that the Court has made a useful 
distinction between a broad right to disclosure that can help prevent 
wrongful convictions in future cases and a narrower right to full answer 
and defence which responds to the danger of a miscarriage of justice in 
specific cases before the Court.15  
In the next section, I will examine how the rights of the accused to 
disclosure and to full answer and defence have fared in the face of 
legislative replies to the Court’s controversial decisions in R. v. 
Seaboyer16 and R. v. O’Connor.17 Parliament altered the balance of 
interests set by the Court in an effort to assert equality and privacy 
rights of child and female complainants and the social interest in 
encouraging the increased reporting of sexual offences. The legislative 
activism in the Parliamentary replies to these two cases stands in stark 
contrast to the legislative inertia that characterizes many measures that 
might help prevent wrongful convictions in the future, including the 
accused’s right to disclosure. I will examine how the Court in R. v. 
Mills18 and R. v. Darrach19 upheld the Parliamentary replies to its 
previous cases in an attempt to reconcile the rights of the accused with 
those asserted on behalf of complainants. I will express some concerns 
                                                                                                            
13 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
14 Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: 
Queens Printer, 1989), at 238-44. 
15 R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 
75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307. 
16 [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
17 [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
18 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
19 [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443. 
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that the Court’s approach to reconciling rights in these cases may 
underestimate how these Parliamentary replies may increase the 
systemic risk of wrongful convictions in future cases, especially in cases 
where the accused may be under-represented and not prepared to bring 
the necessary and onerous pre-trial motions. At the same time, however, 
the Court in Mills and Darrach may have also read down the legislation 
in a manner that may allow trial judges to side with the rights of the 
accused in individual cases where a refusal to introduce or disclose 
sexual or therapeutic history evidence could contribute to a miscarriage 
of justice in an individual case.  
This article on the protection of innocence under section 7 of the 
Charter lies within Lamer J.’s idea that the focus of section 7 should be 
on the justice system.20 It is thus not surprising that the remainder of the 
paper will examine how section 7 of the Charter may affect police, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, juries and appellate courts as they 
administer criminal justice. I will explore how section 7 of the Charter 
has informed civil liability for police and prosecutorial misconduct. 
Starting with Nelles v. Ontario,21 the Supreme Court has rejected claims 
that prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil actions and have 
allowed civil actions for malicious prosecution. Similarly, the Court 
rejected claims that prosecutors should be absolutely immune from law 
society disciplinary action in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta22 and 
opened the possibility that a prosecutor could be subject to professional 
discipline for ethical breaches in relation to non-disclosure of evidence. 
The availability of both civil and disciplinary remedies can help to 
address individual cases in which improper conduct has contributed to a 
miscarriage of justice. At the same time, the high standard of malice or 
improper purpose required in Nelles and Krieger may not have 
established optimal conditions for systemic reforms to decrease the risk 
of misconduct that contributes to wrongful convictions. With respect to 
police conduct, the Court in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse23 recognized 
the role of negligence liability and it will soon hear Hill v. Hamilton-
Wentworth Regional Police24 which raises the important issue of 
                                                                                                            
20 See Jamie Cameron in this volume. 
21 [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, at 195-96. 
22 [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372. 
23 [2003] S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263. 
24 Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2005] O.J. No. 4045 
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 511. 
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whether the police should be held liable for negligent investigative 
practices, in this case relating to the identification of an Aboriginal 
person who was wrongfully convicted of a robbery. This case will raise 
important issues concerning the remedies that are available to victims of 
wrongful convictions and systemic measures to minimize the risk of 
wrongful convictions in future cases.  
Police and prosecutors are not the only criminal justice participants 
who have contributed to wrongful convictions. The Royal Commission 
on the Donald Marshall Prosecution recognized the role of ineffective 
assistance of defence counsel in that wrongful conviction.25 In the next 
section, I will focus on adequate assistance of defence counsel by 
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under section 7 of the 
Charter as it relates to the provision of legal assistance at trial26 and 
claims of inadequate assistance after trial.27 In both cases, I will suggest 
that the Court has recognized that un-represented or under-represented 
accused may in some individual cases be victims of miscarriages of 
justice, but that it has not defined the rights to effective assistance of 
counsel so as to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions in future 
cases. Even with respect to the danger of a miscarriage of justice in an 
individual case, I will argue that the Court has placed too heavy a 
burden on the accused to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct is constitutionally adequate and to demonstrate a reasonable 
probability of a miscarriage of justice. This latter requirement does not 
fit other doctrines such as the jurisprudence on the right to full answer 
and defence that are responsive to a reasonable possibility of a 
miscarriage of justice in an individual case.28 
Although police, prosecutors and defence counsel all play a key role 
in wrongful convictions, the ultimate decision to convict is made by 
judges and juries. I will examine the Court’s evolving approach to the 
need for judicial reasons to justify a conviction. After some initial 
hesitation, the Supreme Court has appropriately affirmed that trial 
judges should give reasons to justify their verdicts. Nevertheless, it has 
                                                                                                            
25 Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: 
Queens Printer, 1989), at 72-77. 
26 G. (J.) v. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46. 
27 R. v. G.D.B., [2000] S.C.J. No. 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520. 
28 R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 
75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307. 
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refused to articulate a right to reasons under section 7 of the Charter as a 
systemic reform that would improve decision making and lessen the risk 
of wrongful convictions, but has rather tied the sufficiency of reasons to 
the existing grounds of appeal.29 Although this provides the possibility 
of remedies in individual cases where there is a miscarriage of justice or 
an unreasonable conviction, the Court’s approach begs the question of 
whether the existing grounds of appeal are adequate. As such, it must be 
understood in the context of the Court’s decision to reject proposals 
made by the Commission on Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction that 
appellate courts should allow appeals on the basis of a lurking doubt 
about guilt.30 
The Court’s approach to the reasons why juries may convict is even 
less satisfactory from the perspective of the protection of innocence. In 
R. v. Pan,31 the Court turned its back on the reasons that may have 
motivated a jury’s decision to convict. It has also left to Parliament the 
overdue task of reforming the overbroad offence against disclosing the 
deliberations of the jury even though such matters would seem to be 
within the inherent domain of the judiciary and implicate section 7 
concerns about the protection of the innocent. Although the Court has 
recognized the dangers and experience of wrongful convictions in Burns 
and other cases and has generally been attentive to claims of 
miscarriages of justice in individual cases, more work needs to be done 
in crafting optimal systemic responses to decrease the risk of wrongful 
convictions in future cases. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE 
THAT THE INNOCENT NOT BE PUNISHED 
There are at least two dimensions to the principle of fundamental justice 
that the innocent not be punished. In the first dimension, the principle 
that the innocent not be convicted or punished relates to individual 
cases. In this context, it is possible to speak of an absolute rule that the 
innocent not be punished regardless of the consequences for society. To 
take the extreme hypothetical of a knowing prosecution of an innocent 
                                                                                                            
29 R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; R. v. Braich, [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903; R. v. Gagnon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 17, 2006 SCC 17. 
30 Hon. Fred Kaufman, Report on the Guy Paul Morin Prosecution (Toronto: Queens 
Printer, 1998); R. v. Biniaris, [2000] S.C.J. No. 16, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381. 
31 R. v. Pan, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344. 
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person, police, prosecutors, witnesses and even judges32 who willfully 
and knowingly participated in the conviction of an innocent person 
could be guilty of the crime of obstructing justice or related crimes.33 
Prosecutors who knowingly prosecuted an innocent person would be 
subject to civil actions34 and professional discipline35 and police officers 
would also be subject to civil suits for the intentional tort of misfeasance 
in the use of a public office.36 The principle that the innocent not be 
punished in individual cases applies not only to deliberate misconduct of 
the type posited above, but also to other individual cases such as 
applications to adduce fresh evidence37 or appeals relating to 
undisclosed evidence or the reasonableness of the verdict.38 Here the 
courts would be obliged to respect both the principle that the innocent 
not be punished, as well as the related principle of proof of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.39 
Matters become more complicated and controversial when a second 
dimension of the principle that the innocent not be punished is 
considered. In this second dimension, the principle applies not to 
                                                                                                            
32 Judges, however, could not be compelled by a public inquiry to explain why they 
convicted an innocent person or even why they sat on a case when they had a prior involvement 
with the accused. MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796. The judges, 
including Pace J. who had been Attorney General of Nova Scotia at the time of Donald Marshall’s 
wrongful conviction, were, subject to an inquiry by the Canadian Judicial Council that did not 
require them to testify and did not recommend that they be removed from office. Inquiry Report 
(1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 292. 
33 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 139. See also s. 140 of the Code defining the 
crime of public mischief to include making false statements to a peace officer accusing people of 
committing crimes and ss. 131, 134, 136 and 137 relating to perjury and other forms of giving false 
evidence. 
34 Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Proulx v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9 discussed infra.  
35 Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 discussed 
infra.  
36 Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263. 
37 R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759. 
38 R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307. 
39 In R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 13, Cory J. stated 
that the principle of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt  
is of fundamental importance to our criminal justice system. It is one of the principal 
safeguards which seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted. The Marshall, Morin 
and Milgaard cases serve as a constant reminder that our system, with all its protections for 
the accused, can still make tragic errors. A fair trial must be the goal of criminal justice. 
There cannot be a fair trial if jurors do not clearly understand the basic and fundamentally 
important concept of the standard of proof that the Crown must meet in order to obtain a 
conviction. 
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individual cases in which innocence is a real possibility, but to all future 
cases. In other words, this second dimension applies to the crafting of 
rules to guide future cases so as to minimize the risk that the innocent 
will be convicted. At this point, some may object to the notion that any 
risk of convicting the innocent is acceptable. A discussion of acceptable 
risks of miscarriages of justice is as uncomfortable as the discussion of 
acceptable risks of cancer or plane crashes. There is an understandable 
desire to argue that everything that is humanly possible must be done to 
avoid these risks and that there is no acceptable level of risk. Set against 
this is the fact that in other contexts, including those such as the 
prevention of disease and accidents, society and the law regularly relies 
on risk management. The due diligence defence that is required as a 
principle of fundamental justice,40 at least when prison is used as a 
penalty,41 is based on the idea that not every step to prevent a wrong will 
be reasonable and it increasingly embraces risk management 
techniques.42 
Even with respect to wrongful convictions, some eminent 
philosophers of law have taken the position that there is no absolute 
right to a system of justice that takes every possible precaution against 
the punishment of the innocent. Lon Fuller, who is famous for his 
natural law position defending the internal morality of law, addressed 
this very problem in his famous 1963 Storrs Lectures. Professor Fuller 
explained: 
… if the question be asked, “How much effort should be expended to 
make certain that no innocent man is ever convicted of crime?,” the 
answer is apt to run toward the absolute, and the suggestion may even 
be made that where fundamental human rights are at stake a question 
so indecently calculative should not even be raised. Yet when we 
reflect that in order to make sure that a decision is right we must 
consume the scarce commodity of time, and that a right decision too 
long delayed may do more damage to the accused himself than a 
mistaken decision promptly rendered, the matter assumes a different 
aspect. We then perceive that even in this case we are compelled to 
                                                                                                            
40 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 
(British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. 
41 R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44. 
42 See generally Todd Archibald, Ken Jull & Kent Roach, Regulatory and Corporate 
Liability: From Due Diligence to Risk Management (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2005). 
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make a calculation that is in the broad sense “economic” even though 
money costs are completely left out of account.43  
Ronald Dworkin, famous for his understanding of rights as trumps 
and his distinction between principle and policy, also draws a similar 
distinction between a “profound right” of a particular person not to 
suffer the “moral harm” of being convicted of a crime that he or she did 
not commit and what he dismisses as an “impractical” and false claim 
that each citizen “has a right to the most accurate procedures possible to 
test his guilt or innocence, no matter how expensive these procedures 
might be to the community as a whole”.44  
Professor Dworkin adds an important qualification to his conclusion 
that there is no right to the most accurate procedures possible: the risk of 
a miscarriage of justice should not be imposed disproportionately in 
violation of the right to equal concern and respect.45 Given the racial, 
class and mental health demographics of the exonerated, Professor 
Dworkin’s exception threatens to swallow his main argument that there 
is no right to the most accurate criminal justice system possible.46 
Nevertheless, it is significant that two of the 20th century’s leading 
theorists of rights both drew a distinction between the right of the 
innocent in an individual case never to be punished and the more 
difficult question of how far society should go to prevent the risks of a 
wrongful conviction being imposed on some unknown person in the 
future. Although the notion of balancing interests when dealing with 
wrongful convictions remains unsettling, the next part of this article will 
suggest that when the Supreme Court squarely tackled this issue in its 
                                                                                                            
43 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at 
179-80. 
44 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 
72, 77. For an argument that Dworkin reduces criminal procedure to matters of policy to be left to 
the legislature and that the principle that the innocent not be convicted recognized by Dworkin in 
individual cases requires prophylactic rules requiring corroboration and expanded appellate powers 
see Michael Plaxton, “A Dworkian Theory of Criminal Procedure”, unpublished SJD Thesis, 
University of Toronto, 2004.   
45 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 
88. He also argues that there is a right to have criminal procedure recognize wrongful convictions 
as a moral harm and to a “consistent weighting” of that moral harm and that “the content of these 
rights provides a middle ground between the denial of all procedural rights and the acceptance of a 
grand right to supreme accuracy”. Id., at 89-90. 
46 For an argument that the risk of imprisoning the innocent is now being 
disproportionately imposed on non-citizens under Canada’s security certificate regime see Kent 
Roach & Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror” (2005) 109 Penn. State 
L. Rev. 967, at 1002ff. 
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decision in United States of America v. Burns, the result was to increase 
protection for all accused including those who may be wrongfully 
convicted in some future case.  
II. FROM KINDLER TO BURNS: SEARCHING FOR A PROPORTIONATE 
RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided that extradition to the United States 
without assurances that the death penalty would not be applied did not 
violate section 7 of the Charter. The majority judgments written by both 
La Forest and McLachlin JJ. decided the issue under section 7 of the 
Charter. Justice La Forest stressed the importance of balancing 
competing interests and gave considerable weight to the danger that 
Canada, given its shared border with the United States, could become a 
safe haven for fugitive American murderers. Justice La Forest also drew 
an analogy between extradition and deportation and suggested that both 
were united in their concerns about ensuring “that a specific kind of 
undesirable alien should not be able to stay in Canada”47 and by the need 
for judicial deference to the executive.48 This theme of deference to the 
executive was also stressed by McLachlin J. in her majority judgment 
where she emphasized that the executive was in a better position than 
the Court to balance competing interests including those “of comity and 
security”.49 Perhaps because they decided the issue under section 7 of 
the Charter and found no violation of the Charter, neither La Forest nor 
McLachlin JJ. considered whether there were more proportionate means 
to honour Canada’s extradition obligations. Indeed, at one point, 
McLachlin J. framed the issue as whether it would be “better that a 
fugitive not face justice at all rather than face the death penalty”50 
despite the fact that the Minister of Justice had not attempted to seek 
assurances from American authorities that the death penalty would not 
be applied. 
The neglect of proportionality analysis in Kindler was unfortunate 
because it would have required the state to demonstrate why its 
legitimate interests in extradition could not be pursued without placing 
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the fugitive’s life at risk. One of the reasons why the majority of the 
Court in Kindler avoided this issue was that it engaged in an internal 
balancing of interests within section 7 and never reached section 1. 
Although the Court has not always been consistent on this point, it often 
does not reach section 1 in its section 7 cases because of its early 
decision to hold that violations of section 7 cannot be justified under 
section 1 of the Charter except perhaps in emergencies.51 Somewhat 
paradoxically, the marginalization of section 1 under section 7 may have 
contributed a process where, as in Kindler, section 7 rights are defined 
more narrowly than they might have been should the balancing of 
interests have been conducted under section 1.52 Under section 1, the 
state would have the burden of justifying limits whereas the balancing 
of conflicting interests within section 7 places the burden on the 
accused. Moreover, the balancing of interests under section 7 tends to be 
much less structured and disciplined and more open-ended than if the 
analysis was conducted under the familiar proportionality test of section 
1 of the Charter.53 
In his dissent in Kindler, Cory J. found that extradition to face the 
death penalty violated section 12 of the Charter by imposing cruel and 
unusual punishment. He described the indignity of various modes of 
execution, but did not address the possibility of executing an innocent 
person. Although wrongful convictions were not as prominent in 1991 
as they were in 2001, they were hardly a secret. Hugo Bedau and 
Michael Radelet had a few years earlier published a landmark study 
outlining 350 miscarriages of justice in American capital cases from 
1900 to 1985.54 In Canada, the report of the Commission into Donald 
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Marshall Jr.’s Wrongful Conviction was published in 1989 and had 
raised awareness of wrongful convictions throughout the Canadian 
criminal justice system. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself had relied on 
this report when it decided the landmark R. v. Stinchcombe55 decision on 
the accused’s right to disclosure. Nevertheless, neglect of the risk of 
wrongful convictions in Kindler may also be related to the fact that only 
one group, Amnesty International, intervened in the 1991 case while in 
Burns a number of associations representing criminal lawyers concerned 
with wrongful convictions intervened in the case.56 One significant 
feature of Cory J.’s dissent on section 12, however, is that it featured the 
section 1 proportionality analysis that was lacking in the majority’s 
decision. Under section 1, Cory J. stressed that there was no evidence to 
support the majority’s concerns about Canada becoming a safe haven 
for American murderers and that Canada’s extradition obligations could 
be fulfilled by extraditing with assurances that the death penalty would 
not be applied.57 
In 2001, the Supreme Court re-visited the issue of extradition to 
face the death penalty in United States of America v. Burns.58 Although 
the Court cited other developments such as the abolition of Canada’s 
last vestiges of the death penalty, a growing international movement 
towards abolition and the dangers of extended stays on death row, the 
main and strongest justification given by the Court for requiring 
assurances that the death penalty not be applied was the dangers of 
executing the innocent. The Court stated: 
 Legal systems have to live with the possibility of error. The 
unique feature of capital punishment is that it puts beyond recall the 
possibility of correction. In recent years, aided by advances in the 
forensic sciences, including DNA testing, the courts and governments 
in this country and elsewhere have come to acknowledge a number of 
instances of wrongful convictions for murder despite all of the careful 
safeguards put in place for the protection of the innocent. The 
instances in Canada are few, but if capital punishment had been 
                                                                                                            
“Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study” (1988) 41 Stanford L. Rev. 121. 
But see also Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, “The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and 
Cassell” (1988) 41 Stanford L. Rev. 161. 
55 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
56 On the importance of support groups in litigation see Charles Epp, The Rights 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
57 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, at 
824-28. 
58 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
262 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
carried out, the result could have been the killing by the government of 
innocent individuals. The names of Marshall, Milgaard, Morin, 
Sophonow and Parsons signal prudence and caution in a murder case. 
Other countries have also experienced revelations of wrongful 
convictions, including states of the United States where the death 
penalty is still imposed and carried into execution.59 
The structure of this statement is interesting because at one level it 
limits the Court’s concerns to the death penalty even though a fugitive 
extradited from Canada could still be wrongfully convicted and, 
consistent with the Court’s ruling, die in prison. In this passage the 
Court may be performing, albeit somewhat silently, the balancing of 
competing interests that is said in Kindler and Burns alike to underlie 
section 7 of the Charter. In other words, the Court may be balancing the 
interest in not punishing the innocent against the state’s interest in 
extraditing fugitives and finding that the former prevails only when the 
punishment imposed is the irreversible one of execution.  
Although Burns generally prohibits extradition without assurances 
that the death penalty will not be applied, it also stands for the converse 
proposition that extradition is constitutional so long as the death penalty 
is off the table. As the late Dianne Martin insightfully indicated, one 
shortcoming in the Court’s otherwise praiseworthy recognition of the 
risk of wrongful convictions is that its decision does nothing to address 
the risk of wrongful convictions in non-death penalty cases. Indeed, as 
Professor Martin pointed out shortly after Burns was decided, the 
extradition process itself remains one that lacks some of the safeguards 
normally found in criminal trials.60 
The only full-proof way to prevent the risk that Canada will 
participate in a miscarriage of justice in a foreign land would be for 
Canada to follow the lead of some rogue states and simply refuse to 
extradite all fugitives. This stance, however, would unduly sacrifice 
Canada’s interests in fulfilling its obligations under its extradition 
treaties. It would also beg the question of miscarriages of justice at 
home. The logical conclusion of the absolutist idea that any risk of a 
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miscarriage of justice is unacceptable might be that all sentences of 
imprisonment or perhaps all convictions violate the principles of 
fundamental justice. No one who wants to be taken seriously would go 
that far. Once the abolitionist response to wrongful convictions is 
rejected, however, we are left with the vexing question of how should 
the courts balance or reconcile the state’s legitimate interest in 
controlling crime with the right of the innocent not to be punished.  
One problem with the balancing process as it was conducted in 
Burns, however, was that it was tacit and opaque. This may be related to 
the rather unstructured character of all balancing of interests exercises in 
general, but it may also be related to an understandable reluctance of 
judges to admit openly that they are willing to accept any level of risk of 
wrongful convictions as an acceptable level of risk. As discussed in Part 
I of this paper, both Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin made provocative 
arguments that while wrongful convictions in individual cases always 
constitute grave moral harms, there is no right to the most accurate 
criminal justice system possible. The analogue in the Charter 
jurisprudence are the Court’s frequent statements that section 7 does not 
guarantee procedures that are the most favourable to the accused, but 
only the basics of a fair trial.61  
Statements that the Charter does not guarantee the most favourable 
procedure or the most accurate system possible are conclusions not 
reasons. They fail to address the critical questions of the extent to which 
additional procedural protections will on the one hand minimize the risk 
of wrongful convictions and on the other hand harm social interests. 
Professor Fuller argued that this is an “economic” question while 
quickly adding that money costs are not relevant. Fuller’s position 
updated to take into account modern rights protection and the Charter 
would revolve around issues of proportionality. In other words, the 
modern version of the “economic” approach to balancing competing 
interests would be to focus on the proportionality question of whether 
there is a less rights invasive means of securing the state’s security 
interest. The main difference between Kindler and Burns is that the 
Court in the latter case addressed this issue of proportionality and 
rejected the idea that “the United States would prefer no extradition at 
                                                                                                            
61 R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 362; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R 668, at para. 72.  
264 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
all to extradition with assurances”.62 In other words, the Court in Burns 
concluded that extradition with assurances that the death penalty not be 
applied was a more proportionate means to advance Canada’s legitimate 
interests in extradition while better respecting the rights of the accused 
in relation to the unavoidable risk of wrongful convictions. Not 
surprisingly, the Court’s assessment of proportionality was most explicit 
when it concluded as part of its section 1 analysis that extradition with 
assurances that the death penalty would not apply would be a less 
restrictive means for Canada to co-operate with foreign states and deter 
fugitives from coming to Canada.63 The section 1 analysis in Burns 
produced more, not less, protection of rights than the internal balancing 
of interests conducted in Kindler.  
Although the right of the innocent not to be punished may exist as 
an absolute right in individual cases, a focus on individual cases 
obscures the fact that many rights and rules, including the one 
proclaimed in Burns, will be proclaimed as general rules that apply 
across cases and will apply, as in Burns, even in cases where there is no 
reasonable possibility to suspect that a wrongful conviction will occur. 
Once rights are seen as applying across cases and influencing the 
criminal justice system as a whole, proportionality analysis may well be 
appropriate to discipline the balance that is struck between competing 
values. Seen in this light, it was appropriate for the Court in Burns to 
have considered whether state interests in extradition could be satisfied 
in a more proportionate manner and Kindler was wrongly decided 
precisely because it did not address the question of whether Canada’s 
interests in extradition could be secured in a less rights invasive manner. 
If social interests are to limit the rights of the accused, this should be 
done in a transparent manner and the government should have to justify 
any limits on those rights as reasonable and proportionate under section 
1 of the Charter.64 
It would be a mistake to read Burns as simply a case about 
extradition and the death penalty even though the Court’s holding was 
limited to those issues. The recognition of the reality and risk of 
wrongful convictions in Burns should affect how the Court approaches 
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the administration of section 7 of the Charter in the criminal justice 
system and beyond. Having accepted that the problem of wrongful 
convictions exists both at home and abroad, it would be hypocritical for 
the Court to limit its response to extradition. In Burns, the Court could 
not very well tell the United States how to reform its criminal justice 
system to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions, but the Court does 
not have the same problem on the homefront. Indeed, the Court should 
be bold and confident in this area precisely because it concluded that 
“occasional miscarriages of the criminal law are located in an area of 
human experience that falls squarely within ‘the inherent domain of the 
judiciary as guardian of the justice system’”.65 The Court elaborated on 
this theme by stating that:  
 The avoidance of conviction and punishment of the innocent has 
long been in the forefront of the basic tenets of our legal system. It is 
reflected in the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter 
and in the elaborate rules governing the collection and presentation of 
evidence, fair trial procedures, and the availability of appeals.66 
The principle that the innocent not be convicted articulated in this 
passage has implications that go far beyond the limited context of 
extradition and the death penalty. In the remaining parts of the paper, I 
will examine whether the Court has lived up to the promise of Burns 
both in terms of ensuring that reasonable and proportionate efforts are 
made in all cases to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions and 
whether the Court has been sufficiently responsive to claims that a 
miscarriage of justice may have occurred in the individual case before it. 
III. DISCLOSURE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s section 7 jurisprudence giving the accused a broad 
right to disclosure of relevant evidence in the possession of the Crown is 
arguably the most important development in our criminal justice system 
in the last quarter century. It has transformed the way the justice system 
operates and this new right has been crafted in no small part as a 
systemic measure that would apply across cases to lower the risk of 
wrongful convictions. The failure to disclose inconsistent statements 
and exculpatory material has played an important role in many wrongful 
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convictions. The Marshall Commission for example revealed how Mr. 
Marshall was deprived of inconsistent statements made by the witnesses 
who perjured themselves in his murder trial and exonerating evidence 
that was given to the police shortly after his conviction.67 
In R. v. Stinchcombe, the Court dealt with the accused’s request for 
the written and recorded statements that the police had taken from his 
former secretary after she had given evidence favourable to the accused 
at the preliminary hearing. The Court built on a decision earlier that year 
that affirmed a common law right to disclosure from the Crown68 but 
took the step of constitutionalizing the right to disclosure as a principle 
of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. Justice Sopinka 
explained: 
The right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of 
criminal justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the 
innocent are not convicted. Recent events have demonstrated that the 
erosion of this right due to non-disclosure was an important factor in 
the conviction and incarceration of an innocent person. In the Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution … the 
Commissioners found that prior inconsistent statements were not 
disclosed to the defence. This was an important contributing factor in 
the miscarriage of justice which occurred and led the Commission to 
state that “anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls 
short of decency and fair play”.69 
In some respects, the Court went beyond the Marshall 
Commission’s recommendations70 that the Criminal Code be amended 
to require disclosure by concluding that all relevant and non-privileged 
information held by the Crown should be disclosed without regard to 
whether the information was inculpatory or exculpatory and without 
regard to whether statements related to a person who might be called as 
a witness. Such a broad right to disclosure can be defended as providing 
the accused with all the available raw materials in the state’s possession 
to combat the risk of error and to protect the accused’s right to full 
answer and defence. The broad scope of the duty to disclose articulated 
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by the Court in Stinchcombe may in some cases provide the accused 
with some material to fight the phenomena of tunnel vision by arguing 
that the police ignored evidence in its possession that was consistent 
with the suspect’s innocence. 
The Court’s constitutionalization of disclosure requirements was a 
bold move. In taking the leap that it did, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Court first examined whether social interests would be harmed by 
the new right to disclosure. Justice Sopinka predicted that disclosure 
disputes could be avoided by the adoption of “uniform, comprehensive 
rules for disclosure” and that disclosure could increase efficiency by 
producing an “increase in guilty pleas, withdrawal of charges and 
shortening or waiving of preliminary hearings”.71 Justice Sopinka may 
have been overly optimistic in these predictions, but the fact that he 
made them is significant because it suggests that the Court was not 
prepared to impose broad disclosure obligations without regard to their 
costs or their effect on competing social interests. As in Burns, the 
Court’s consideration of whether increased rights were a proportionate 
measure to protect innocence was not fatal to the case of reform.   
Although the Court in Stinchcombe expressed some optimism that 
uniform and comprehensive rules to govern disclosure would increase 
efficiency in the criminal justice system, the new rights recognized in 
the case have turned out to be quite costly to administer. For example, 
the Stinchcombe case itself came back to the Court four years later when 
the accused argued that the trial judge was correct to stay proceedings 
when the Crown only disclosed copies as opposed to originals of the 
secretary’s statements to the police. Justice Sopinka explained that the 
Crown could only be expected to disclose what was in its possession 
and that in the absence of misconduct in destroying the originals, a stay 
of proceedings was not appropriate.72 In a number of decisions in the 
1990s, the Court returned to questions such as the extent of the Crown’s 
disclosure obligations,73 the limits of the Crown’s discretion to delay 
disclosure and to protect the identity of informers,74 the concept of 
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relevant evidence,75 the Crown’s duty to retain evidence and the proper 
approach to lost material that could not be disclosed.76 
In several cases, the Court distinguished between the accused’s right 
to disclosure and the accused’s right to full answer and defence. In R. v. 
Dixon,77 the Court stressed that not every violation of the accused’s right 
to disclosure will violate the accused’s right to full answer and defence. 
It indicated that a new trial will be a minimum remedy if the accused’s 
right to full answer and defence has been violated and related that issue 
to whether there is a reasonable possibility that the undisclosed evidence 
would affect the reliability of the verdict.78 On the other hand, violations 
of the right to disclosure require no such minimum remedies and can in 
some cases be considered harmless. The Court’s dualistic approach to 
the rights and remedies at stake in disclosure fits into the distinction 
drawn in the first part of this paper between rights that attempt to reduce 
the risk of miscarriages of justice in future cases and rights that respond 
to the possibility of a wrongful conviction in the particular case before 
the Court. In other words, the Court has maintained a broad and 
generous approach to defining the right to disclosure in a manner that 
requires the broadest form of pre-trial disclosure in all cases while 
defining the right to full answer and defence more narrowly so that it is 
only violated when there is a possibility that a trial has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice or an unfair trial.   
In R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay,79 the Court demonstrated that it was 
prepared to enforce the rights to disclosure and full answer and defence 
with some rigour. The Court affirmed that the right to disclosure existed 
at common law independent of the Court’s decision in Stinchcombe and 
it again pointed out that a failure to make disclosure was one of the 
causes of “catastrophic judicial errors” that had caused Donald Marshall 
Jr.’s wrongful conviction.80 The case involved convictions, including a 
guilty plea, by two accused to first degree murder. The undisclosed 
evidence was discovered by the Poitras Commission into police 
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misconduct and concerned inconsistent statements by some Crown 
witnesses that were not disclosed to the accused, as well as other 
statements by undisclosed witnesses that were inconsistent with the 
Crown’s case, including one relating to the location of the 14-year-old 
murder victim on the night she was killed. The Court found that there 
was a reasonable possibility that the undisclosed evidence affected the 
decision of one accused to plea, the reliability of the verdicts and the 
fairness of the trial process. It also indicated that the test for dealing 
with undisclosed evidence would be somewhat more generous to the 
accused than the test for admitting fresh evidence on appeal.81 The Court 
affirmed that a new trial would be the minimum remedy for a violation 
of the accused’s right to full answer and defence. This minimal remedy 
would apply without regard to competing social interests. At the same 
time, the Court held that a stay of proceedings was appropriate for one 
of the accused given the time he had already served and the fact that 
another trial would “be the perpetuation of an injustice”.82  
In justifying his decision to constitutionalize the accused’s right to 
disclosure, Sopinka J. noted that the “legislators have been content to 
leave the development of the law in this area to the courts”.83 This fits 
into the pattern of Parliament being relatively unconcerned about the 
dangers of wrongful convictions.84 As will be seen in the next section, 
however, Parliament has been more active in restricting the accused’s 
access to information and evidence in sexual assault cases.  
IV. LIMITS ON THE ACCUSED’S RIGHTS TO DISCLOSURE AND 
FULL ANSWER AND DEFENCE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES 
Although the Court filled a legislative vacuum when implementing 
Stinchcombe, it encountered legislative resistance when implementing 
the accused’s right to full answer and defence in sexual assault cases. 
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This raises the delicate question of the incidence of wrongful 
convictions in such cases. DNA analysis has increased the likelihood of 
wrongful convictions being discovered in rape cases and 90 per cent of 
exonerations in the United States in non-homicide cases are rape cases. 
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld have argued that it is important to learn 
about wrongful convictions from the current experience of DNA 
exonerations because they predict that DNA exonerations will 
eventually dry up given contemporary standards of obtaining DNA 
warrants and using DNA analysis to exclude suspects.85 The availability 
of DNA material is greater in rape cases than other crimes and this 
means that rape convictions are held to higher standards of review than 
in cases where DNA is not available.86 It is thus not surprising that in 
Canada several wrongful convictions have been revealed in sexual 
assault and rape cases and this does not necessarily suggest that there is 
a higher rate of error in such cases as opposed to other cases. 
Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the names of those wrongfully 
convicted of sexual assault in Canada remain relatively unknown.87 In 
any event, it is clear that the accused’s right both to access and adduce 
evidence has played out somewhat differently in the context of sexual 
assault prosecutions, despite the fact that wrongful convictions have 
occurred in such cases. 
In R. v. Seaboyer88 the Court in a 7:2 decision held that the so-called 
rape shield law that prohibited the introduction of evidence of the 
complainant’s prior sexual conduct except with respect to rebuttal 
evidence, evidence going to identity and evidence relating to the 
incident in question, violated the accused’s right to make full answer 
and defence. Justice McLachlin for the majority related the right to full 
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answer and defence to the principle of fundamental justice that the 
innocent should not be convicted:  
 Given the primacy in our system of justice of the principle that the 
innocent should not be convicted, the right to present one’s case should 
not be curtailed in the absence of an assurance that the curtailment is 
clearly justified by even stronger contrary considerations. What is 
required is a law which protects the fundamental right to a fair trial 
while avoiding the illegitimate inferences from other sexual conduct that 
the complainant is more likely to have consented to the act or less likely 
to be telling the truth.89 
The Court found that the law restricting the admissibility of defence 
evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct was overbroad 
because of its restrictive pigeonhole approach and because it did not 
distinguish between illegitimate uses of the evidence — those that used 
the myths that a woman was more likely to have consented or less likely 
to be believed because of her prior sexual activity — and legitimate uses 
of the evidence directed at other relevant and probative issues in the trial. 
Although the Court found that section 276 of the Code violated 
section 7 of the Charter, it was prepared to consider the state’s case for 
justifying the violation under section 1 of the Charter on a deferential 
standard that conceived the case as involving the competing rights of the 
accused and the complainant. It indicated that there was a rational 
connection between the legislation and its objectives in preventing the 
sexist use of sexual conduct evidence, but concluded that a law that 
excludes “probative defence evidence which is not clearly outweighed 
by the prejudice it may cause to the trial strikes the wrong balance 
between the rights of complainants and the rights of the accused. The 
line must be drawn short of the point where it results in an unfair trial 
and the possible conviction of an innocent person. Section 276 fails this 
test.”90 The Court reformulated a less categorical rule to determine the 
relevance of prior sexual conduct evidence but one that, unlike the old 
section 276, applied to the complainant’s prior sexual conduct with the 
accused. 
Parliament was under great pressure to act even though the Court 
had already refashioned the common law rules to advance the objective 
of preventing sexist use of sexual conduct legislation as far as was 
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consistent with the accused’s right to full answer and defence. The new 
section 276(1) embraced the Court’s understanding of impermissible 
uses of sexual conduct evidence by providing that sexual conduct 
evidence, whether with the accused or another person, was not 
admissible “to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature 
of the activity” the complainant was more likely to have consented or 
less worthy of belief. In R. v. Darrach,91 the Court held that this rule 
excluded evidence offered for illegitimate sexist reasons that was not 
related to a fair trial. In other words the accused had no right to adduce 
misleading or irrelevant evidence. At the same time, the Court also read 
down section 276(1) so that it would not apply to prior sexual conduct 
that was offered for a legitimate purpose not related to the sexual nature 
of the activity. Justice Gonthier explained:  
evidence of sexual activity is proffered for its non-sexual features, 
such as to show a pattern of conduct or a prior inconsistent statement, 
it may be permitted. The phrase “by reason of the sexual nature of that 
activity” has the same effect as the qualification “solely to support the 
inference” in Seaboyer in that it limits the exclusion of evidence to 
that used to invoke the “twin myths”.92 
The Court also held that the requirement in section 276(2) that the 
sexual conduct evidence should have “significant probative value that is 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper 
administration of justice” should be read down to refer to evidence that 
“the evidence is not to be so trifling as to be incapable, in the context of 
all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt”.93 In justifying this 
reading down of the requirement that the evidence have significant 
probative value, Gonthier J. employed both the French language version 
of the law that did not include the word significant and the principle that 
laws should be interpreted where possible to avoid violating the 
accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Although such an 
interpretative remedy would apply in all cases, it will be most relevant 
in providing a remedy in a particular case in which denial of the ability 
to call prior sexual conduct evidence might contribute to a miscarriage 
of justice.  
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Although it left some room for exceptions when required to respect 
the accused’s right to full answer and defence, the Court in Darrach 
upheld a law that will in general restrict the accused’s ability to call 
prior sexual conduct evidence. To this end, it upheld various procedural 
and substantive restrictions on the admissibility of prior sexual conduct 
evidence. In particular, the Court upheld the requirement that the 
accused submit an affidavit and be cross-examined on it when seeking 
to justify the introduction of evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual 
conduct. Furthermore, the Court upheld the rule that the complainant 
could not be compelled to testify at the voir dire or subject to cross-
examination by the accused as necessary to protect the complainant’s 
privacy and to encourage the reporting of sexual offences. Such 
procedural requirements and evidential restrictions may in some cases 
deter accused persons from attempting to adduce such evidence. This 
may particularly be true in cases in which the accused is un-represented 
or under-represented by counsel. The un-represented or under-
represented accused may also not fully appreciate how, as discussed 
above, section 276 has been read down in some crucial respects to 
accommodate the accused’s right to full answer and defence. In these 
ways, the new law may at the margins increase the risk that in some 
cases the accused will not even attempt to adduce evidence that might 
raise a reasonable doubt about guilt. Beyond this systemic concern, 
however, section 276 as interpreted by the Court in Darrach appears to 
have left room to allow sexual conduct evidence to be introduced when 
required to respect the accused’s right to full answer and defence. 
Professor David Paciocco, however, has expressed concerns that 
Darrach is ambiguous on the issue of whether probative evidence could 
be excluded because of its prejudice. He argues that such evidence should 
never be excluded on the basis that it would be “an affront to the most 
basic principles of our criminal justice system” to prefer the privacy 
interests of the complainant or the social interest in encouraging 
complaints to the accused’s right to introduce significant evidence that 
could raise a reasonable doubt.94 At the same time, however, the Court 
seems to have resolved at least two borderline issues in favour of the 
accused: namely reading the twin myth exclusion down to prohibit the 
introduction of sexual conduct evidence only by reason of the sexual 
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nature of the activity and reading the requirement of significant probative 
value down to a requirement that the evidence only be of more than 
trifling probative value. In both cases, the Court related its decisions to 
read section 276 down to the accused’s right to full answer and defence 
and the related principle of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
my view, the greater concern that the courts are running the risk of 
ignoring evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt about the accused’s 
guilt lies not so much with restrictions on the admissibility of the 
complainant’s prior sexual conduct under section 276, but with respect to 
restrictions under sections 278.1-278.9 on the production, disclosure and 
admissibility of the complainant’s private records.95 
In R. v. O’Connor,96 the Supreme Court dealt with an application for 
defence access to complainants’ school, medical and counselling 
records in an historical sexual assault prosecution. The majority of the 
Court outlined a two-step procedure that would govern the production of 
private records to the court and to the accused. It stressed that this new 
procedure would not apply to private records already possessed by the 
Crown which would be subject to the Stinchcombe duty of disclosure 
and would be presumed to be relevant to the accused’s defence.97 At the 
first stage, in order to justify production to the trial judge, the majority 
ruled that the accused would have to establish the likely relevance of the 
material to an issue at trial including the credibility of the complainant. 
The majority stressed the difficulties faced by the accused who had not 
seen the documents. The minority would only require production to the 
judge at the first stage if the accused established that the material was 
useful to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. At  
the second stage, the majority of the Court required a balancing of the 
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accused’s rights against the privacy rights of the complainant while the 
minority would also require consideration of the equality rights of 
women and children and the societal interest in encouraging 
complainants to seek treatment and bring complaints of sexual assault. 
The same split in the Court occurred in a subsequent case in which the 
majority of the Court held that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate 
remedy when a rape crisis centre had, consistent with its standard 
policy, destroyed notes of an interview with the complainant. The 
minority expressed doubts about the relevance of the interview notes 
and concluded that a stay of proceedings was an excessive remedy.98  
Parliament responded to all this controversy with new legislation 
that codified a two-step procedure to govern production to the trial 
judge and the accused. The new legislation departed from the majority’s 
procedure in O’Connor by applying to records held by the Crown and 
otherwise subject to Stinchcombe and by requiring consideration of 
equality rights and social interests in reporting and counselling at both 
the production and disclosure stages of the two-step process. Moreover, 
the new legislation also provided an extensive list of 11 possible 
assertions that an accused could make in an attempt to justify the 
production of private records to the judge. The legislation then 
categorically deemed that all 11 arguments, either alone or combined, 
were insufficient to justify production to the court. Section 278.3(4) of 
the Criminal Code is such an extraordinary piece of legislation that it 
deserves to be quoted in its entirety: 
 278.3(4) Any one or more of the following assertions by the 
accused are not sufficient on their own to establish that the record is 
likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to 
testify: 
(a) that the record exists; 
(b) that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy 
or counselling that the complainant or witness has received or is 
receiving; 
(c) that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of 
the proceedings; 
(d) that the record may disclose a prior inconsistent statement of the 
complainant or witness; 
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(e) that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or 
witness; 
(f) that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the 
complainant or witness merely because the complainant or 
witness has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, therapy 
or counselling; 
(g) that the record may reveal allegations of sexual abuse of the 
complainant by a person other than the accused; 
(h) that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant 
with any person, including the accused; 
(i) that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent 
complaint; 
(j) that the record relates to the complainant’s sexual reputation; or 
(k) that the record was made close in time to a complaint or to the 
activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge against the 
accused. 
As my colleague Hamish Stewart has observed, “taken literally, this 
subsection seems to doom any application from the outset”.99  
The new legislation also placed another barrier in the way of 
production to the trial judge by providing that in determining whether 
the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial, the judge should consider 
not only the accused’s right to full answer and defence, but also the 
complainant’s rights to privacy and equality100 and society’s interests in 
encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and the obtaining of 
treatment by victims of sexual offences.101 As Jamie Cameron has 
observed, Parliament’s restrictive approach to production to the trial 
judge is a direct reversal of the Court’s approach in O’Connor which 
only balanced competing rights after the judge had seen the documents 
and before they were disclosed to the accused and even then only 
balanced the accused’s right to full answer and defence against the 
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privacy rights of the complainant.102 In this respect, the legislation on its 
face made more incursions on adjudicative fairness than even the 
security certificate procedures under immigration law which allow the 
judge (but not the detainee) to examine all possibly relevant evidence.103 
Moreover, the private records legislation is also more restrictive than the 
security certificate regime because it subjects material held by the state 
to the same restrictive regime of deemed insufficient grounds and 
balancing of competing rights and social interests whereas courts have 
stressed the state’s duty to disclose all relevant evidence to the judge in 
security certificate cases.104 The severe restrictions on production of 
records to the judge in sections 278.3 and 278.5 of the Criminal Code 
raise real questions about Parliament’s apparent lack of concern about 
the dangers of convicting the innocent.  
The final stage of the reply legislation governs whether private 
records that are produced and examined by the judge in a private 
hearing should then be disclosed to the accused. Here the judge is asked 
again to balance the accused’s right to full answer and defence with the 
complainant’s privacy and equality rights and the social interest in 
reporting sexual assaults and receiving counselling. Consistent with 
principles of proportionality, the legislation quite sensibly contemplates 
disclosure to the accused subject to conditions designed to restrict the 
invasion of privacy such as editing the document or restricting its 
further distribution. The legislation also allows the trial judge to take a 
variety of steps including editing and prohibiting further distribution of 
the material.105 
In R. v. Mills,106 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of Parliament’s new regime for the production of records. Despite the 
significant differences between the new regime and the O’Connor 
regime, the Court declined to strike the law down. It stressed that 
Parliament was entitled to diverge from the O’Connor scheme and to act 
on its own interpretation of the Charter even when Parliament’s 
interpretation of the Charter differed from that already provided by the 
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Court on the same issue. The Court sought to legitimate this holding by 
reference to the concepts of both reconciling competing rights and 
fostering dialogue between courts and legislatures.107 I have expressed 
my reservations about the Court’s approach to both rights and dialogue 
elsewhere and will not repeat them here.108 I will only raise the 
additional issue of how vulnerable the innocent are under a 
reconciliation of rights approach that is loathe to admit that the 
accused’s right to full answer and defence is being limited. As Ronald 
Dworkin has observed with respect to the attenuated procedural 
protections that are now being deployed with respect to terrorist 
suspects, there is an important difference between admitting that a risk 
of miscarriages of justice exists and simply ignoring and denying any 
risk altogether.109 A jurisprudential approach that insists that the 
accused’s rights are not being limited but simply reconciled with those 
of victims and potential victims, especially when combined with one in 
which the judiciary defers to the legislature’s interpretation of the rights 
of the accused even when the legislature departs from the judiciary’s 
prior interpretation of those rights, is one that is likely to increase the 
risk of convicting the innocent. 
The only dissenting voice in Mills came from Lamer C.J. and only 
applied to Parliament’s decision to extend the restrictive production 
regime to private records that were in the Crown’s possession. Chief 
Justice Lamer reasoned: 
 As this Court maintained in Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 336, the 
right of an accused to make full answer and defence is a pillar of 
criminal justice on which we rely heavily to prevent the conviction of 
the innocent. It is a principle of fundamental justice protected by ss. 7 
and 11(d) of the Charter. Flowing from the right to make full answer 
and defence is the Crown’s constitutional and ethical duty to disclose 
all information in its possession reasonably capable of affecting the 
accused’s ability to raise a reasonable doubt concerning his 
innocence.110 
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Chief Justice Lamer was not blind to the state’s interest in 
protecting the complainant’s privacy and equality rights. He proposed as 
a more proportionate means to advance these interests that all records 
held by the Crown be disclosed not directly to the accused but to the 
trial judge where they would be subject to the second stage of balancing 
the accused’s rights against those of the complainant before being 
disclosed to the accused.111 Chief Justice Lamer considered the section 1 
case for limiting the accused’s right to full answer and defence, but 
concluded that it could not be made out given less restrictive 
alternatives and because “the risk of suppressing relevant evidence and 
of convicting an innocent person outweighs the salutary effects of the 
impugned provisions on privacy and equality rights”.112 His decision 
reaffirms that a full and disciplined section 1 proportionality analysis 
can often produce more, not less, protections for the innocent than the 
more open-ended internal balancing and reconciliation of rights 
approach taken by the majority in Mills. 
Although the Court’s refusal to strike down the restrictive 
legislative regime that governs production of records remains in my 
view regrettable, it is important to recognize that the Court in Mills, as 
in Darrach, has read down some of the features of the legislative regime 
that may produce the greatest danger of denying the judge or the 
accused access to evidence that may raise a reasonable doubt about 
guilt. The majority in Mills recognized that the right to full answer and 
defence “is crucial to ensuring that the innocent are not convicted” and 
expressed some sensitivity to placing the accused in an impossible 
catch-22 position to establish the relevance of documents he had not 
seen.113 It also indicated that “where the information contained in a 
record directly bears on the right to make full answer and defence, 
privacy rights must yield to the need to avoid convicting the 
innocent”.114 The Court read down the broad insufficient grounds 
discussed above so that they only applied to bare assertions and would 
not apply if the accused could “point to case specific evidence or 
information to show that the record in issue is likely relevant to an issue 
at trial or the competence of a witness to testify”.115 The Court also 
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stressed that in borderline or uncertain cases, judges should at least look 
at the record 116 and that “[i]t can never be in the interests of justice for 
an accused to be denied the right to make full answer and defence”.117 
As in Darrach, the Court may have preserved some space for judges to 
act in cases where the restricted evidence could raise a reasonable doubt 
about the accused’s guilt. At the same time upholding the restrictive 
production and disclosure regime may have a systemic effect of 
deterring unrepresented and under-represented accused from even 
attempting to gain access to the complainant’s private records.  
Some of the issues discussed in Mills were revisited by the Court a 
few years later in R. v. Shearing.118 The Court held that the restrictions 
on production of private documents discussed above did not apply in a 
case in which the accused had come into lawful possession of the 
complainant’s diary. This ruling, however, raises the question of 
whether the accused could have obtained production of the diary 
through sections 278.1 to 278.9 had he not otherwise gained access to 
the diary. Much depends on how trial judges exercise their discretion 
with respect to the very broad insufficient grounds provision, as well as 
with respect to the balancing of competing rights. The majority of the 
Court in Shearing also concluded that the accused could cross-examine 
the complainant on her diary including the lack of an entry about the 
alleged sexual assault. Don Stuart has suggested that Shearing may 
indicate a shift of tone back to Seaboyer119 and towards the primacy of 
the accused’s right to full answer and defence.120 For example, Binnie J. 
took the opportunity to disagree with a judge below who had concluded 
that “Mills has shifted the balance away from the primary emphasis on 
the rights of the accused” on the basis that Mills “itself affirms the 
primacy — in the last resort — of the requirement of a fair trial to avoid 
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the wrongful conviction of the innocent”.121 Professor Stuart is correct to 
point out this shift in tone, one that may be related to heightened 
awareness of wrongful convictions in sexual assault cases, but the fact 
remains that the restrictions on production and disclosure in sections 
278.1-278.9 remain in place even if they were not applicable on the 
particular facts of Shearing.  
The material discussed in this section suggests that Parliament may 
be relatively unconcerned with the risk of convicting the innocent when 
it legislates. Although the Court has interpreted such legislation to leave 
some room for judges to protect the innocent in individual cases, the 
Court in both Mills and Darrach was reluctant to strike down legislation 
that by imposing high hurdles on the accused to gain access to evidence 
may increase the systemic risk of wrongful convictions in future cases. 
V. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROSECUTORIAL AND POLICE 
MISCONDUCT THAT CONTRIBUTES TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Even the most generous protections for disclosure will not protect 
innocence if they are flouted by the police or prosecutors. Although it 
would be a mistake to reduce wrongful convictions to questions of 
individual misconduct as opposed to systemic failures, misconduct by 
police and prosecutors has been found to contribute to wrongful 
convictions. This raises the issue of the standards for holding 
prosecutors and police accountable for such conduct. 
The Court related the Crown’s duty to disclose relevant evidence to 
the distinct role of the prosecutor as a Minister of Justice who is 
supposed to be more concerned that justice is done than in winning the 
case. This vision of the prosecutor suggested not only that the 
prosecutor should never knowingly suppress information that would 
support the accused’s claim to innocence, but also that the prosecutor 
should comply readily with broad rights of disclosure that are designed 
to serve the interests of justice.122 In Nelles v. Ontario,123 the Supreme 
Court appealed to the same vision of the prosecutor as a minister of 
justice to justify the rejection of the idea that prosecutors should be 
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absolutely immune from civil actions with respect to the performance of 
their duties. Justice Lamer quoted Rand J.’s famous statement in 
Boucher v. The Queen that “[t]he role of prosecutor excludes any notion 
of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which 
in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal 
responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense 
of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.” 
He also reasoned that absolute immunity from civil liability could have 
the effect of denying access to a Charter remedy because a prosecutor 
who engaged in a malicious prosecution “would be depriving an 
individual of the right to liberty and security of the person in a manner 
that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice.”124 This 
aspect of the case has at times been neglected, but it constitutionalizes 
malicious prosecutions lawsuits125 and gives content to the section 7 
principle that the innocent should not be punished. Only L’Heureux-
Dubé J. in dissent was prepared to take the view that “[t]he freedom of 
action of Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys is vital to the 
effective functioning of our criminal justice system. In my view, the 
greater public interest is best served by giving absolute immunity to 
these agents.”126 
In Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General),127 the Supreme Court in a 
narrow 4:3 decision upheld a successful malicious prosecution suit on 
the basis that the prosecutors had charged the plaintiff with first degree 
murder without reasonable and probable grounds and on the basis of an 
improper purpose related to the defence of a defamation suit. The 
majority found many flaws in the identification evidence and 
surreptitious electric recordings relied upon by the Crown and stressed 
that the Crown “must have sufficient evidence to believe that guilt could 
properly be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before reasonable and 
probable cause exists, and criminal proceedings can be initiated. A 
lower threshold for initiating prosecutions would be incompatible with 
                                                                                                            
124 Id., at para. 50. 
125 In some jurisdictions this could allow lawsuits to be brought even though barred by 
statutes of limitations. See Prete v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1993] O.J. No. 2794, 110 D.L.R. 
(4th) 94 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 46. 
126 Nelles v. Ontario, supra, note 123, at para. 95. 
127 [2001] S.C.J. No. 65, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) The Protection of Innocence 283 
the prosecutor’s role as a public officer charged with ensuring justice is 
respected and pursued.”128  
The Court also held that the prosecutor acted with malice which was 
broadly interpreted to include improper purpose either by allowing the 
prosecution to be used in aid of a defence of a defamation action or 
through a “tainted tunnel vision” in which the prosecutor decided “to 
secure a conviction at all costs” with the “tainted assistance” of a former 
police officer who was defending a defamation action brought by the 
accused. The majority stressed that Nelles must not be taken to have 
established a “remedy . . . only in theory and not in practice”.129  
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent argued that the fact the 
plaintiff was committed at a preliminary hearing and convicted of 
murder at trial was telling evidence that the Crown had reasonable and 
probable grounds to charge the accused.130 This conclusion, however, 
ignores the fact recognized in United States v. Burns that the criminal 
process has produced wrongful convictions. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
argued that there was no evidence that the Crown attorney “acted for 
personal purposes, out of vengeance or ill-will toward the appellant, in 
bad faith or beyond his mandate for improper purposes, or that he 
committed a fraud on the law”.131 Although the dissent’s malice standard 
included improper purposes, its restrictive approach was highlighted by 
the idea of ill-will, vengeance and fraud. 
The majority’s judgment in Proulx is an important recognition that 
the Nelles standard for malicious prosecution includes a broader range 
of improper purpose and is not limited to proof of malice as a narrow 
form of individual subjective fault. The majority’s recognition of 
“tainted tunnel vision” as a form of malice is also intriguing given how 
recent public inquiries have found tunnel vision to be a prime cause of 
wrongful convictions.132 The Court’s affirmation of a damage claim of 
over $1 million in Proulx also suggests that some victims of malicious 
prosecutions will be successful in obtaining significant compensation. 
At the same time, however, the Court in Proulx made clear that a 
                                                                                                            
128 Id., at para. 31. 
129 Id., at para. 44. 
130 Id., at paras. 205ff. 
131 Id., at para. 242. 
132 Hon. Fred Kaufman, Report on the Guy Paul Morin Prosecution (Toronto: Queens 
Printer, 1998), recommendation 74; Hon. Peter Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow 
Prosecution (Winnipeg: Queens Printer, 2001); Right Hon. Antonio Lamer, The Inquiry Regarding 
Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons and Randy Druken (St. John’s: Queen’s Printer, 2006). 
284 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
successful malicious prosecution action “must be based on more than 
recklessness or gross negligence”.133 This dicta, however, should not be 
read as precluding liability based on negligence for prosecutorial 
misconduct which was not at issue in Proulx. Indeed, a number of 
Courts of Appeals have left the door open to actions for negligent 
prosecutions134 and the Supreme Court has not fully shut it. 
In my view, there is much to be said for a broader liability rule that 
could apply not only to “tainted tunnel vision” but to grossly negligent 
tunnel vision and negligent prosecutions.135 In such an approach, liability 
might be better directed at the Crown as an entity136 as opposed to 
individual prosecutors in recognition that many prosecutorial abuses are 
caused more by “organizational factors such as excessive workload, 
poor standard operating procedures and … tunnel vision” than “ill-
willed individuals”.137 To the extent that reliance in Nelles and Proulx is 
placed on the high standards of prosecutorial conduct contemplated in 
Boucher, one would have thought that this might justify requiring higher 
standards of conduct on Crown prosecutors than simply that they refrain 
from acting out of malice, ill will or vengeance. In Stinchcombe, the 
Boucher vision of the prosecutor as a minister of justice was used to 
justify very high standards for the disclosure of all relevant evidence 
and not more minimal standards that would only prohibit bad faith and 
fraudulent failures to make full disclosure. 
Although one might have thought that the Court’s decision in Nelles 
laid to rest any idea that prosecutors are immune, they resurfaced in 
Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta138 where the Attorney General of 
Alberta argued that prosecutors should be immune from disciplinary 
decisions before the law society in relation to delayed disclosure of a 
DNA test that was favourable to the accused. The Supreme Court held 
that prosecutors could be subject to professional discipline so long as 
they were not engaged in a good faith and proper exercise of 
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prosecutorial discretion. It held that “[r]eview by the Law Society for 
bad faith or improper purpose by a prosecutor does not constitute a 
review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion per se, since an official 
action which is undertaken in bad faith or for improper motives is not 
within the scope of the powers of the Attorney General”.139 The Court 
appeared to have applied the high standard that a prosecutor must act in 
bad faith or for improper purposes not only to exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion, but to disclosure violations even though it rightly 
characterized disclosure as a matter of “prosecutorial duty” and not a 
matter of “prosecutorial discretion”.140 Although the bad faith or 
dishonesty standard has been defended as consistent with Nelles,141 my 
own view is that it may place a higher premium on proof of subjective 
fault than the majority’s decision in Proulx.  
The high Krieger threshold of bad faith or improper purpose may 
make it extremely difficult to subject prosecutors to professional 
discipline in a manner that might help prevent wrongful convictions. 
This is unfortunate because law society discipline should serve a 
preventive and licensing function142 that is not necessarily limited to the 
type of conduct that attracts civil liability for intentional torts. 
Fortunately, prosecutors across Canada are starting to demonstrate an 
admirable desire to learn from the experience of wrongful convictions 
and are probably in front of most law societies on these matters.143 
Nevertheless, requiring higher standards for prosecutors with respect to 
both civil liability and professional discipline might help minimize the 
risk of wrongful convictions. A negligence standard is not an invitation 
to judicial second-guessing of prosecutorial conduct and it should not 
deter legitimate exercises of prosecutorial discretion.  
A reluctance to impose negligence standards on prosecutors would 
create an anomaly with respect to the police who are subject to liability 
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in negligence.144 In Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse,145 the Supreme Court 
refused to strike out negligence claims against a Police Chief in relation 
to the failure of officers to co-operate with a Special Investigation Unit 
investigation into a fatal shooting.146 Justice Iacobucci observed for the 
Court that:  
Although the vast majority of police officers in our country exercise 
their powers responsibly, members of the force have a significant 
capacity to affect members of the public adversely through improper 
conduct in the exercise of police functions. It is only reasonable that 
members of the public vulnerable to the consequences of police 
misconduct would expect that a chief of police would take reasonable 
care to prevent, or at least to discourage, members of the force from 
injuring members of the public through improper conduct in the 
exercise of police functions.147 
Applying the above-quoted standard, the police should have a duty 
of care towards subjects of investigations for negligent conduct that 
might contribute to a wrongful conviction and there should be no policy 
reasons, especially as related to indeterminate liability, to defeat such a 
duty of care. The Court has frequently held that the common law should 
reflect Charter values, and it has already recognized the relevance of 
section 7 of the Charter in Nelles. The imposition of a duty of care on 
the police with respect to subjects of investigations would respect the 
section 7 principle that the innocent should not be punished. It would 
provide potential remedies for individual victims of negligent police 
investigations, including those that have resulted in wrongful 
convictions or other miscarriages of justice, and it would also act as a 
systemic incentive to encourage the police to take reasonable steps to 
prevent wrongful convictions in future cases. 
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The duty of care on the police when they conduct investigations will 
likely be clarified by the Supreme Court in the upcoming case of Hill v. 
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board.148 A five judge 
panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously accepted that police 
officers owed a duty of care to a suspect and that harm to the suspect from 
a negligent investigation was reasonably foreseeable. Justice MacPherson 
for the entire panel on this issue rejected the idea that liability for 
negligence would interfere with valid police work. He stated:  
The assertion that the imposition of a legal duty of care on the police 
with respect to their criminal investigations will cause the police to 
change the way they perform their professional duties is, in my view, 
both unproven and unlikely. Surgeons do not turn off the light over the 
operating room table because they owe a duty of care to their patients. 
They perform the operation, with care. The owners of summer resorts 
do not lock the gates because they owe a duty of care to their 
customers. They open their resorts and take care to make them safe. In 
short, the “chilling effect” scenario … is, in my view, both speculative 
and counterintuitive.149 
The Court of Appeal stated while its conclusions were at odds with 
those of the House of Lords,150 it was consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to strike out negligence claims against a police chief in 
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse.151 Although the Court of Appeal 
distinguished prosecutors from police on the basis that the former 
perform quasi-judicial duties, all of the other functional considerations 
that supported negligence liability in Hill would seem to apply to 
prosecutorial negligence. For example, in both cases there would be “no 
alternative remedy for the loss suffered by a person by reason of 
wrongful prosecution and conviction”, the right to liberty and the 
principles of fundamental justice under section 7 would be implicated 
and there would be no concerns about indeterminate liability or liability 
for legitimate policy choices.152  
Hill will also be an important case on the merits because the Ontario 
Court of Appeal split 3:2 on whether the police officers were negligent 
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in their investigation. The majority held that the police had not acted 
negligently despite the fact that the plaintiff, an Aboriginal person, was 
the only non-white person in a 12-person photo line-up used in an 
attempt to identify a serial bank robber that had been described by many 
witnesses as non-white. Faulty identifications are the leading cause of 
wrongful convictions and the case may provide the Supreme Court with 
an opportunity to clarify proper identification procedures. The case also 
involves the equally important issue of tunnel vision as the police and 
the prosecutor persisted in the prosecution despite the fact that the serial 
robberies continued after Mr. Hill was imprisoned and another suspect 
was identified and eventually charged with other robberies. Finally, the 
case will again raise the issue of the over-representation of Aboriginal 
persons in the criminal justice system.153 Justices Feldman and Laforme 
noted in their strong dissent that this was a “very significant case 
involving another wrongful conviction of an Aboriginal person in 
Canada, who served more than 20 months in prison for a crime he did 
not commit…”.154 An affirmation that the police owe suspects a duty of 
care and an articulation of appropriate standards for cross-racial 
identifications could help individuals receive effective remedies for 
wrongful convictions and encourage the police to take reasonable 
precautions in all cases against the real risk of wrongful convictions.  
VI. THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE ROLE 
OF DEFENCE COUNSEL 
Prosecutors and police are not the only criminal process actors that can 
contribute to miscarriages of justice. Another area crucial to the 
protection of innocence is the adverse consequences of the accused not 
being represented or being inadequately represented by defence counsel. 
The Supreme Court’s section 7 jurisprudence seems surprisingly 
underdeveloped given the importance of these topics and the 
voluminous comparative jurisprudence under the American Bill of 
Rights. In general, the Court has opened the door to interventions in 
individual cases where a lack of counsel or inadequate representation of 
counsel may contribute to a miscarriage of justice in the case before the 
court, but it has yet to take a strong stand that will encourage adequate 
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defence lawyering as a systemic safeguard that can lessen the risks of 
wrongful convictions in future cases. 
In R. v. Prosper,155 the Supreme Court refused to require toll free 
access to duty counsel in part because the framers of the Charter had 
considered but rejected a right to counsel for those without sufficient 
means to pay for counsel when required in the interests of justice. Chief 
Justice Lamer also expressed concerns about requiring governments to 
spend funds or devising remedies to enforce positive obligations.156 
Although it stressed that the framers’ decision to reject a right to legal 
aid was entitled to more weight than the more general intent of the 
framers on other issues,157 the Court’s approach in Prosper was in 
tension to its interpretative approach in many other Charter cases. For 
example, the Court was not deterred by relatively clear intent that the 
framers intended section 7 of the Charter to only provide procedural 
protections and that it would not affect abortion.158 The concern in 
Prosper about not requiring governments to spend money on positive 
obligations was also in tension to other Charter cases that implicitly 
required the expenditure of funds.159 
In the 1999 case of New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v. G. (J.),160 the Court took a somewhat bolder 
approach than in Prosper and ordered that section 7 of the Charter 
required the provision of counsel in a hearing in which the state sought 
custody of a parent’s child. The Court stressed the complexity of the 
scheduled three-day hearing in which 15 affidavits and two expert 
reports would be presented, as well as the limited capacities of the 
parent and the stakes of extending the state’s custody of the children for 
another six months. The Court considered the state’s interests in 
controlling legal aid expenditures, but found that these were outweighed 
by the need to provide counsel when essential to ensure a fair hearing. 
Chief Justice Lamer reconciled his approach with that taken in Prosper 
simply by indicating that the section 7 right to counsel would not apply 
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in all cases where a person’s life, liberty or security of the person was at 
stake, but only in those cases where a fair hearing would not be possible 
without counsel.161 This suggests that section 7 will generally only 
produce case by case remedies with respect to the provision of counsel. 
It is odd that after 20 years of section 7 jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has not yet outlined the test for when defence counsel is required 
to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial. In G. (J.), the Court took note 
of a variety of Court of Appeal cases dealing with section 7 claims for 
counsel in criminal trials, but did not comment on the validity of those 
cases or the appropriate remedy that would apply in the criminal 
context. The remedial problems should not be insurmountable as the 
Court would have the options of either staying proceedings or ordering 
counsel to be provided.162  
One justification for a broader approach to the right to have counsel 
provided is the increased dangers of wrongful convictions or other 
miscarriages of justice when an accused is not assisted by a lawyer in 
our increasingly complex criminal process.163 One shortcoming to such a 
broad systemic approach, however, may be that the prevalence of 
wrongful convictions in less serious cases is not well known and the 
causes of such wrongful convictions are not well understood. The 
reasons for this are speculative but groups such as AIDWYC 
understandably focus their limited resources on the most serious cases. 
There are also considerable costs, including in terms of time and 
exposure, in invoking the process under sections 696.1-696.6 of the 
Criminal Code.164  
In G.D.B., the Court considered the issue of inadequate assistance of 
counsel in a criminal trial.165 The claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel revolved around a defence counsel’s tactical decision not to use 
a tape recording of the complainant denying shortly after she left home 
that her stepfather had sexually molested her. In this case the Court 
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recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel as a principle of 
fundamental justice under section 7,166 but adopted the deferential and 
oft-criticized American test for determining ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Under the Strickland v. Washington167 test an accused must first 
establish that the alleged incompetence of counsel caused a miscarriage 
of justice and then that counsel’s actions were unreasonable. With 
respect to the first step, the Court in G.D.B. did not specifically address 
the issue of the probability of a miscarriage of justice occurring and 
simply concluded “[t]here was no miscarriage of justice”.168 The United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington169 has, however, 
required that there be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” This standard imposes a high 
standard on the accused to establish a reasonable probability of a 
miscarriage of justice whereas in other areas of Canadian constitutional 
law, including with respect to the right to full answer and defence, the 
focus is on whether there is a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of 
justice.170 If G.D.B. has indeed incorporated the Strickland requirement 
of a reasonable probability of a miscarriage of justice then the Court has 
adopted a higher standard for intervening when the cause of the alleged 
miscarriage of justice is ineffective assistance of counsel as opposed to 
denial of the right to full answer and defence. Such differing approaches 
to miscarriages of justice seem wrong in principle. A miscarriage of 
justice is a miscarriage of justice however it has been caused. Moreover, 
a miscarriage should be defined in a manner consistent with the 
fundamental requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The reasonable possibility standard is more consistent with the 
reasonable doubt standard than the American reasonable probability 
standard.  
With respect to the second step in the test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the Court in G.D.B. indicated that there is “a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of 
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reasonable professional assistance”.171 The second step raises the 
question of whether a court could in good conscience ignore a 
reasonable probability or preferably a reasonable possibility of a 
miscarriage of justice on the basis that the lawyer’s conduct would still 
fall within the presumption of reasonableness.  
From the perspective of avoiding miscarriages of justice, it is 
unfortunate that the Court has followed the restrictive and oft-
criticized172 American approach and not followed the approach taken by 
the Quebec Court of Appeal and most Commonwealth countries which 
focuses simply on whether counsel’s conduct rendered “the conviction 
unsafe and unsatisfactory”.173 The Commonwealth approach does not 
attempt to judge the flagrancy of counsel’s error.174 Moreover, the 
Commonwealth approach also seems to be more consistent with the 
focus on a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of justice in other 
section 7 jurisprudence. The Court’s approach in G.D.B. seems less than 
optimal both in terms of responding to a risk of a miscarriage of justice 
in an individual case and encouraging systemic measures that will 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions in future cases.175  
VII. JUDGES, THE REASONS FOR CONVICTIONS AND 
THE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL 
Before the Charter, the Supreme Court was reluctant to require judges to 
give reasons for their decisions on the basis that “the volume of criminal 
work makes an indiscriminate requirement of reasons impractical, 
especially in provincial criminal courts, and the risk of ending up with a 
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ritual formula makes it undesirable to fetter the discretion of trial 
judges”.176 This approach, including a presumption that trial judges know 
the law and concerns about slowing the system of justice, influenced the 
Court’s 1994 decision in R. v. Burns not to require trial judges to give 
reasons for their verdicts or decisions. In that case, the Court upheld a 
conviction of sexual and indecent assault despite the Court of Appeal’s 
concerns about the young age of the complainant and the fact that the 
complainant had initially complained of sexual abuse by her stepbrother 
and not the accused.177 In 1995, the Court upheld the briefest and most 
conclusory of reasons provided by a trial judge about the admissibility of 
statements to the police after a complex voir dire.178 In neither of these 
cases did the Court make reference to section 7 of the Charter or related 
concepts of fairness and reasons in administrative law. These cases 
represented a total failure to recognize that a lack of reasons could 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice in an individual case and that the 
systemic message that judges need not deliver reasons could encourage 
practices that could increase the risk of wrongful convictions.  
In two cases decided in 1996, the Court re-visited the issue and 
made clear that Burns should not be read as authority for the broad 
proposition that trial judges never have to provide reasons, especially in 
cases where the law was unclear179 or where the evidence was confused 
and contradictory.180 In 2002, the Court addressed the trial judge’s duty 
to give reasons in a series of cases. The lead case, R. v. Sheppard, held 
that a trial judge had given insufficient reasons when he convicted an 
accused of possession of stolen property in a case with no physical 
evidence and by asserting that he found the testimony of the accused’s 
ex-girlfriend more credible than that of the accused. Although the Court 
justified the requirement for reasons in terms of explaining the verdict to 
the parties and the public, much of the decision related the need for 
reasons to the right to have meaningful appellate review. Justice Binnie 
stressed that “[t]he simple underlying rule is that if, in the opinion of the 
appeal court, the deficiencies in the reasons prevent meaningful 
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appellate review of the correctness of the decision, then an error of law 
has been committed”.181 He also added that this functional approach to 
reasons and appeals would in appropriate cases allow appellate courts to 
conclude that the absence of reasons was either an error of law, a 
miscarriage of justice or contributed to an unreasonable verdict under 
section 686 of the Criminal Code.182 The reasons were insufficient in 
Sheppard in large part because it was not clear that the trial judge had 
properly applied the reasonable doubt standard even if he did find the 
ex-girlfriend’s testimony to be more credible than that of the accused.183 
A more robust approach to the need for reasons, however, would have 
created a free-standing right under section 7 of the Charter to reasons, 
both in order to ensure procedural justice for the accused and, as 
Professor Quigley has suggested, “as a mechanism for avoiding 
wrongful convictions”. 184 
The utility of the Sheppard approach in providing relief from 
possible miscarriages of justice is inextricably tied to whether the 
grounds for appeals from convictions under section 686 are adequate. In 
the companion case of R. v. Braich,185 the Court held that the trial 
judge’s reasons were sufficient despite the fact the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal had concluded that a conviction was unsafe because of 
mistakes and inconsistencies in the identification evidence given by 
victims of a drive-by shooting. The Court stressed that the absence of 
reasons was not a free-standing ground of appeal and that the Court of 
Appeal had not found the trial judge’s guilty verdict to be unreasonable. 
Justice Binnie concluded that the Court of Appeal “simply took the view 
that if the trial judge had thought harder about the problems and written 
a more extensive analysis he might have reached a different conclusion 
… [the Court of Appeal] considered the conviction ‘unsafe’ but, with 
respect, his conclusion was driven more by the peculiarities of the facts 
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than the alleged inadequacies of the trial reasons. A lurking doubt about 
an ‘unsafe’ verdict is not sufficient to justify appellate intervention.”186 
Braich underlines how closely the Court’s functional approach to the 
giving of reasons is tied to the existing grounds of appeal. Indeed,  
the functional approach to reasons in Sheppard and Braich begs the 
question of whether the existing grounds of appeals from convictions 
under section 686 are adequate. 
In his report on Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction, Kaufman J. 
recommended that Courts of Appeal should be able to set aside a 
conviction on the basis of a lurking doubt as to guilt.187 Justice Kaufman 
did not address whether such a standard should be introduced through 
statutory expansion of the existing grounds of appeals or through 
judicial interpretation of the existing grounds of appeal. He did, 
however, cite some Courts of Appeal that had already introduced the 
concept of the safety of the verdict into the existing grounds of appeals. 
Indeed, in 1996, the Supreme Court had come close to reading the 
lurking doubt standard into section 686 when it ruled that “the 
conviction rests on shaky ground and that it would be unsafe to maintain 
it” adding that the power to overturn unreasonable guilty verdicts under 
section 686(1)(a) “was intended as an additional and salutary safeguard 
against the conviction of the innocent”.188  
In R. v. Biniaris,189 however, the Supreme Court refused to read the 
lurking doubt concept into section 686 when it stated that “It is 
insufficient for the court of appeal to refer to a vague unease, or a 
lingering or lurking doubt based on its own review of the evidence. This 
‘lurking doubt’ may be a powerful trigger for thorough appellate 
scrutiny of the evidence, but it is not, without further articulation of the 
basis for such doubt, a proper basis upon which to interfere with the 
findings of a jury.”190 Although the Court has made clear that a lack of 
reasons or a lurking doubt may be a trigger to find that a conviction is 
unreasonable or a miscarriage of justice under section 686, it has refused 
to make a lurking doubt in itself a ground for appeal. It is to be hoped 
that appellate courts will use the existing law to intervene in cases where 
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there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict may be unsafe, but the 
Supreme Court’s approach to reasons and to the existing grounds of 
appeal may not be optimal in promoting systemic practices to minimize 
the risk of wrongful convictions. 
The close and sometimes confusing connection between the reasons 
given by trial judges and the grounds for appeal courts to overturn 
convictions under section 686 was at issue in the recent case of R. v. 
Gagnon.191 In that case, the Court split 3:2 over the adequacy of the 
reasons given to convict the accused of sexual assault of a young child 
that he had cared for in a day-care centre. Justices Bastarache and 
Abella for the majority distinguished Sheppard and applied Braich on 
the basis that the trial judge had given extensive reasons for accepting 
the testimony of the child complainant and for not finding the accused’s 
testimony that denied the sexual assault to be credible.192 They indicated 
that after having “admonished trial judges to explain their reasons on 
credibility and reasonable doubt in a way that permits adequate review 
by an appellate court … it would be counterproductive to dissect them 
minutely in a way that undermines the trial judge’s responsibility for 
weighing all of the evidence.”193 As in Braich, the majority in Gagnon 
stressed that although the Court of Appeal had overturned the 
conviction, it had not found the verdict to be unreasonable and that there 
was a reasonable basis for the trial judge’s conclusions on credibility.  
In dissent, Deschamps and Fish JJ. consistently blended their 
analysis of the sufficiency of the reasons under Sheppard and the 
reasonableness of the verdict under Biniaris. For example, they 
concluded that “regardless of whether … [the trial judge’s] decision is 
characterized as being unreasonable, the judgment is found to be wrong 
in law, or … the reasons are considered inadequate … we must reach 
the same conclusion: the guilty verdict entered by the trial judge should 
be set aside and a new trial ordered…”.194 Their dissent also raises the 
possibility that the standard for concluding that a guilty verdict is 
unreasonable may be lower in judge-alone trials because of the ability of 
appellate courts to scrutinize the judge’s reasons. They stressed that 
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“[j]uries do not give reasons for their verdict, but judges do. A judge’s 
verdict must be reviewed with this in mind.”195 In the result, they were 
prepared to review the trial judge’s reasons for rejecting the accused’s 
testimony on the basis that those conclusions conflicted “with the bulk 
of judicial experience in the assessment of credibility”.196 At the same 
time, however, Deschamps and Fish JJ. focused solely on assessing the 
trial judge’s reasons for rejecting the accused’s testimony while not 
addressing the trial judge’s acceptance of the complainant’s testimony.  
The split in Gagnon suggests that the close connection under 
Sheppard between the adequacy of reasons and the grounds for appeal 
may sow confusion. As a matter of first principle, it might be advisable to 
separate the adequacy of reasons from the reasonableness of the verdict: 
each issue is important in its own right. On this basis, the majority’s 
approach in Gagnon seems persuasive on the adequacy of the reasons, but 
is lacking in its refusal to address the reasonableness of the verdict. In 
contrast, the minority’s approach does not fully address the reasonable-
ness of the verdict given its narrow focus on the reasons for rejecting the 
accused’s testimony and its refusal to deal with the child’s testimony 
which the trial judge found to be reliable because the child’s reports of 
having been abused were spontaneous, consistent and detailed.  
The minority’s demanding approach to the reasonableness of the 
trial judge’s verdict also begs the questions of the adequacy of the test 
for determining the reasonableness of a jury’s verdict which by 
definition will not include reasons. Indeed, the minority seems to 
suggest that in jury trials the focus has only been on whether the verdict 
can be supported on the evidence whereas section 686 contemplates that 
verdicts can be set aside when they are “unreasonable or cannot be 
supported by the evidence”.197 As will be seen, the role of juries in 
wrongful convictions is particularly problematic. 
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VIII. JURORS, SECRECY AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 
Although the Court has indicated that a failure by trial judges to give 
reasons to support a guilty verdict may be a grounds for a successful 
appeal, it has taken a position on jury secrecy that, with the exception of 
evidence of external interference, suggests that courts will not consider 
any reasons that may emerge about why a jury has convicted an 
accused.  
In R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer198 the Court rejected a section 7 challenge 
to the traditional doctrine of jury secrecy including a more flexible case 
by case approach articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada. The Court reasoned that “We 
would be doing jurors a disservice, in my view, to tell them, on the one 
hand, that everything they say in the course of their deliberations is 
private and confidential, and, on the other hand, to decide after the 
deliberations are over whether in fact we will give effect to our 
guarantee of confidentiality…. More certainty and predictability is 
required for jury secrecy to be meaningful.”199 This approach, however, 
ignores that even information covered by solicitor and client privilege or 
police informer privileges is subject to innocence at stake exceptions.200 
It raises the unedifying prospect of confirming convictions that were 
decided by a majority as opposed to a unanimous decision of the jury or 
decisions that were influenced by racist stereotypes that cannot be 
totally controlled through the use of challenges for cause. With respect 
to the latter, the evidence sought to be admitted in Sawyer related to 
claims that racial comments were made by the jury in a trial of co-
accused, one who was white, the other black.201 In addition, there is 
some evidence that one of the jurors who wrongly convicted Donald 
Marshall Jr. may have been influenced by racist stereotypes about both 
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the Aboriginal accused and the African-Canadian victim.202 The Court’s 
approach to even possibly racist reasons used by a jury to convict 
appears to be: “don’t ask, don’t admit”. The costs of such injustices are 
a very high price to pay for maintaining the confidences of jurors or the 
finality of their verdicts.  
The Pan case could have been decided differently if it was viewed 
through the prism of concerns about wrongful convictions and 
innocence at stake exceptions to even the most revered privileges. The 
Court raised the spectre of acquittals being overturned or tainted by 
evidence about the jury’s deliberations,203 but this would not be a 
problem under a limited exception that admitted evidence of jury 
deliberations only when it revealed a reasonable possibility of a 
miscarriage of justice. The Court’s discussion of whether the common 
law rule and section 649 of the Code violated section 7 of the Charter 
never really engaged the principle that the innocent should not be 
punished.204 Indeed, the innocence at stake principle is a foundational 
principle that should inform both the common law and section 7 of the 
Charter.  
In addition to the vital question of remedies in individual cases of 
possible miscarriages of justice, a bolder approach in Pan would have 
invalidated the crime of revealing the deliberations of the jury as an 
unjustified violation of freedom of expression. Such a decision could 
have encouraged systemic reforms by legalizing research about how 
actual jurors make their crucial decisions. The Court recognized the 
need for such research, but relied upon an invitation to Parliament to 
consider the case for legislative reform, even though the Law Reform 
Commission had already made the case for reform in 1982.205 The past 
record on issues affecting the protection of innocence suggests that the 
continued wait for Parliamentary reform could be long indeed.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The principle that the innocent should not be punished is the most 
fundamental of all the fundamental principles of justice. The 
punishment of the innocent is a travesty of justice that benefits no one. 
Nevertheless the implementation of this bedrock principle is complex 
and controversial. A primary issue is what constitutes innocence. 
Although DNA exonerations and other forms of exonerating the 
wrongfully convicted and the actually innocent are valuable reminders 
of the fallibility of the system, it is unrealistic to expect such certainty in 
all cases. Innocence in this paper has been defined in relation to the 
broader concept of miscarriages of justice which is based on the 
foundational principles that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt and that trials must be fair. Cases such as United States of 
America v. Burns206 recognize the tragic reality of wrongful convictions 
and require courts to take systemic steps to minimize the risk of 
wrongful convictions in future cases, but courts must remain attentive to 
any miscarriage of justice in any particular case. Both individual and 
systemic strategies to protect innocence are necessary and 
complementary: no systemic measure will reduce the risk of error in the 
criminal process to zero and hence the system must always be attentive 
to claims of miscarriages of justice in individual cases. 
Another disagreement is whether the principle that the innocent not 
be punished should be balanced with other interests. Drawing on the 
work of Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin,207 I have suggested that a 
useful distinction can be made between the need for courts to respond to 
a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of justice in an individual case 
before them without regard to competing social interests and the need to 
take systemic but proportionate measures in all future cases to minimize 
the risk of wrongful convictions. The former strategy is well represented 
in the primacy that the Court has given in its section 7 jurisprudence to 
protecting the accused’s right to full answer and defence but is 
compromised by suggestions in cases such as G.D.B.208 that courts 
should wait until a miscarriage of justice is probable. The latter systemic 
strategy is well represented by decisions such as United States of 
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America v. Burns209 and R. v. Stinchcombe210 which adopt systemic 
safeguards in recognition of the risk of wrongful convictions in some 
future cases, but only after carefully considering whether the new rights 
articulated by the Court would have a proportionate effect on competing 
social interests.  
Many but not all of the cases examined in this paper have involved 
the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter. Some of the cases were 
decided simply on the basis of evolving common law principles. The 
process of constitutionalization, however, may help underline questions 
of principle. The Court should aspire to using the idea that the innocent 
not be punished as a coherent and demanding principle that can inform 
much of section 7 and the related common law. Greater use of the 
constitutional principle that the innocent not be punished may also 
provide some, albeit not complete, protection from legislative 
resistance. Parliament’s record on the protection of innocence has not 
been inspiring. It has placed restrictions on the ability of the accused to 
access evidence in sexual assault cases and it has ignored judicial 
invitations to take steps to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions in 
other cases. One of the main messages of this paper is that the protection 
of innocence, in both its individual and systemic dimensions, should be 
seen as a matter within the inherent domain of the judiciary. The task of 
protecting the innocent should not be left to Parliament as a majoritarian 
institution with little apparent concern for remote risks of punishing the 
innocent. In this regard, we are fortunate that the Supreme Court in 
cases such as Stinchcombe and Burns was prepared to take matters of 
justice into their own hands. 
The topics examined in this paper have been eclectic,211 but this 
underlines how the principle of protecting the innocent can help direct 
the wide swath that section 7 cuts across the justice system. The task of 
protecting innocence is too important and too pervasive to be cabined to 
the discrete categories of substantive, procedural or evidential law or to 
be limited to criminal as opposed to civil or administrative law. The 
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protection of innocence cannot be limited to the operation of the 
criminal justice system and for this reason the liability of criminal 
justice actors to civil actions and professional discipline were discussed 
in this paper. In the post 9/11 environment, it is dangerous to limit 
concerns about imprisoning the innocent to criminal law and the 
Supreme Court should be concerned with protecting innocence at both 
individual and systemic levels in the forthcoming cases that will 
consider whether the use of immigration security certificate to detain 
terrorist suspects indefinitely without full disclosure or adversarial 
challenge of the government’s case violates section 7 of the Charter. 
Wrongful convictions have disproportionately occurred in terrorism cases 
and care should be taken before sanctioning procedures that provide far 
less protections for innocence than the criminal trial.212 
In the end, we must ask whether section 7 of the Charter has 
improved the protection of the innocence in our justice system? It is too 
soon to make a final judgment in part because we are only starting to 
understand the prevalence and causes of wrongful convictions. 
Nevertheless, there have been some important victories for the 
protection of innocence under section 7 of the Charter. In a number of 
cases, most notably Burns, the Court has recognized that the conviction 
of the innocent is a problem that requires remedies. Admitting that there 
is a problem is a necessary first step to addressing it. The Court’s 
decision in Stinchcombe was an important step in creating broad 
disclosure rights and relating a failure to make full disclosure with 
wrongful convictions. At the same time, however, the Court has failed 
to apply the principle that the innocent should not be convicted in the 
context of the confidentiality of jury deliberations. In other areas such as 
the right to reasons, the right to adequate legal assistance, civil and 
professional discipline for prosecutorial misconduct and the production, 
disclosure and admissibility of some crucial defence evidence in sexual 
assault prosecutions, the Court deserves credit for opening a door for 
remedies for miscarriages of justice in individual cases. Nevertheless, 
the section 7 jurisprudence in all of these areas does not live up to the 
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promise of Burns by taking broader systemic measures to reduce the 
risk of wrongful convictions in future cases. 
Systemic reforms to minimize the risk of miscarriages of justice in 
future cases should not be undertaken recklessly, but with attention to 
principles of proportionality drawn from section 1 of the Charter. 
Application of proportionality principles in cases such as Stinchcombe 
and Burns, however, suggests that the result of disciplined 
proportionality analysis may be more, not less, systemic protections 
against wrongful convictions. The most fundamental of our fundamental 
principles of justice, the right of the innocent not to be punished, has 
rightly received significant attention under section 7 of the Charter. 
More, however, needs to be done. 
 
